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BOOK REVIEWS
FREE MAN VERSUS HIS GOVERNMENT. ARTHUR L. HARDING,
Ed. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1958. Pp. xi,
117. $3.00.
This study adds number five to the series of "Studies in Jurispru-
dence" growing out of the annual conference on legal problems held
at the Southern Methodist University School of Law. This volume
consists of four essays as follows: "Freedom to Believe" by Merrimon
Cuninggim, Dean of Perkins School of Theology, Southern Methodist
University; "Freedom to Learn" by Samuel E. Stumpf, Professor
of Philosophy, Vanderbilt University; "Freedom of Political Associa-
tion" by Frederick K. Beutel, Professor of Law, University of Ne-
braska; and "Freedom to Use Property" by Arthur L. Harding,
Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. In addition to
contributing the last-named essay, Professor Harding edits and
introduces the entire volume.
Anyone who has attended any of the annual conferences on Law
in Society presented by the Southwestern Legal Foundation at the
Southern Methodist University or has read the papers presented at
these conferences knows that the very best thinkers of this and
other countries participate in these programs. In this respect the
1957 conference, from whence these four essays came, was no ex-
ception.
The title which has been given this volume is suggestive of the
whole political history of man. It implies the seeds of every revolu-
tion and the unhappiness of people flowing from well meaning,
though ignorant or misunderstanding agents of government, or,
perhaps, from just plain mean, selfish, or ambitious controllers of
people. To combat this type of government with the hope of being
free men, people in all times in all countries have attempted to de-
vise instruments by means of which those who governed the people
would themselves be governed legally by those whom they were gov-
erning. The concept of natural law as an instrument of control was
widely proclaimed by many early day political thinkers. From the the-
ories advanced by the natural law exponents, as well as from other
sources, came the concept of another type of law by means of which
the governed hoped they might control their governors. We know
this new law as constitutional law. Regardless of how excellent
natural law was in theory, means for its enforcement as law were
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never successfully devised. The legal architects of the American
constitutional system and law-a law designed as an instrument for
controlling the government-realized that it was much easier to
create a system of government built on constitutional law than it
was to fashion the instruments of procedure through which this
law would accomplish its purposes. The failure of the American
people to come up with a completely satisfying answer to this prob-
lem of enforcement furnishes the base for much thinking which
is reflected in this volume of "FREE MAN VERSUS HIS GOVERN-
MENT."
In his introduction to this volume, Professor Harding succinctly
states its main theme when he says the study is designed "to examine
certain ideas of Natural Rights in their contemporary setting; to
determine what interests are asserted or what liberties are claimed
in title of these rights, and to determine to what extent they are
accorded recognition in contemporary legal doctrine." A very fine
statement of natural law in its historical setting is given by Pro-
fessor Harding as a basis for understanding the four essays as they
stem from contemporary legal doctrine.
Dean Cuninggim rightfully assumes that "freedom to believe"
must be more than merely freedom for mental activity-it must
include freedom to speak and act. When he answers the question
"Who has it?" in terms of this broader meaning, he finds that those
who have it most are the Protestant Christians. He then proceeds
to show that in both historical and current practices there are seven
groups who have it less or least. These groups are the blasphemers,
Sabbath-breakers, atheists, polygamists, Jehovah's Witnesses, con-
scientious objectors, and Catholics. With numerous case citations and
references to other studies, the Dean makes out a good case for his
thesis. He shows that there has been much confused thinking on the
part of lawmakers and law interpreters especially in separating re-
ligion from Christian morality.
One would hope that the gap between the freedom of the Pro-
testant Christians to believe and the restricted freedom allowed mem-
bers of the several groups mentioned is not as great as might be im-
plied from the evidence given by Dean Cuninggim. From the
point of view of law, this gap is quite small. Whenever the law-
maker has attempted to put more severe restraints in the field of
religion on one group than are placed on other groups, the courts
have been rather consistent in striking down the laws. The Jehovah's
Witnesses, for example, have lost very few of their cases in court.
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It would be difficult to find legal discriminations against Catholics.
It must be remembered when evaluating any of the four studies
in this volume that the basic plan of the American government
contemplates a government which will be controlled by two quite
distinct instruments of popular control; namely, a legal control
effected through the courts, and secondly, a political control effected
through the ballot and petition or lobby. A people must have both
types of control to have a democracy. The legal instrument pro-
tects the minority; the political instrument enables the majority to
give effect to its will through government. No people would have
freedom in the true sense of the word unless both these instru-
ments-the legal and the political-were properly functioning. If
the Protestant Christians are in the majority, their will should
prevail only in those areas subject to political control. If a Sabbath-
breaker is in the minority, his will should prevail only in those areas
rightfully belonging to the law. Our constitutional architects hoped
the line separating the two areas would be properly drawn in the
Constitution. Dean Cuninggim shows quite clearly that in the
realm of government reserved for the majority, religious minorities
are more restricted. As long as imperfect minds make and interpret
the law we can expect some of these discriminating political restric-
tions to find their way into our legal practices even though the
subject matter is one dealing with an area supposedly withdrawn
from the control of the States' will, namely, religion.
Mr. Stumpf in his essay, "Freedom to Learn," very thoughtfully
and quite skillfully points out the ever present conflict that exists
on the one hand, between the right of and necessity for the in-
dividual to learn in order to form good judgments or vote in-
telligently, and, on the other, the right of and necessity for society
to preserve the stability of its institutions. Plato's allegory of the
cave is utilized in showing why people will work so hard to put
curbs on the freedom to learn, while, at the same time, they are
investing time and money in education and research in their efforts
to seek truth and understanding.
Any civilized man knows that we must have both freedom to
learn and stability in our society. Both must be preserved through
law. Mr. Stumpf explains how this preservation is sought in various
types of educational and legal systems, and what political theorists
from the time of Plato to the present have theorized on this subject.
He has done this as only a philosopher steeped in a knowledge of po-
litical and legal thought could do. The layman, the agent of govern-
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ment, the student of law, and the social and political philosopher
will find much here that will add to his learning.
"Freedom of Political Association" is not listed as one of the
basic freedoms in our Bill of Rights. Yet, no people could be expected
to control successfully their agents of government unless permitted
freely to associate for political purposes. A political association which
was compelled to reflect the will of government would be a poor de-
vice for use by a people expecting to control that government by
peaceful or legal means.
After establishing that the Constitution provides for the right
of the people to assemble peaceably and petition for redress of
grievances, Professor Beutel indicates that the "right" (not pri-
vilege) to vote more or less follows. Although acknowledging that
the original Constitution left the matter of voting qualifications to
the states, he maintains that the later amendments have largely
federalized the "right" to vote. After mixing constitutional pro-
visions and state and federal laws and court decisions with actions
and policies of private groups and organizations as these deal with
political associations, Professor Beutel concludes that court decisions
are not much help in understanding the subject. After all, "what is
important are the social factors."
In discussing Nixon v. Herndon' the case in which the so-called
Texas White Man's Primary Law was declared unconstitutional,
a stronger case could have been made for its invalidity on the ground
that it illegally interfered with the rights of the Democrats to
form a party and seek the votes of the Negroes. Of course, this
law was void on the grounds used by the Supreme Court, but a
greater danger to the freedom of political associations would exist
if the government could by law forbid a large group of people like
the Democrats from forming their own party with members of
their choice than would exist if it compelled the admission of indi-
viduals to an association where the members of the association did
not want them. For the benefit of those who might not be acquainted
with Texas politics, it could be pointed out that it would be difficult
to find a Democratic candidate for a public office who did not wel-
come the Negro's vote.
The purpose and function of constitutional law as opposed to the
function and purpose of statutory law are utterly confused in
this essay. For example, the author indicates that the actions of in-
dividuals and private groups as well as actions of agents of govern-
'273 U.S. 536 (1927).
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ment are controlled by constitutional provisions. Also, when the
Supreme Court held in Collins v. Hardyman' that the federal courts
had no civil remedy for the breaking up of political meetings, he
indicated that this is not good law because the fourteenth, fifteenth,
and nineteenth amendments give Congress the power to regulate all
subjects with which these amendments deal. One should read this
essay more as a student of sociology and less as a student of govern-
ment and law.
Professor Harding, in his study on the "Freedom to Use Property,"
undertakes to describe the historical origin and nature of the rights
of private property, then to explain the current prevailing ideas on
this subject, and finally, to indicate some of the trends we might
expect in the future regarding the legal right to use property. He
does each of these with a thoroughness and an understanding that
only a scholar fully grounded in a knowledge of political, religious,
and legal history could do. He traces the changing concepts of the
ownership and use of property from the early church fathers through
feudalism, the scholastics of the Middle Ages, and the political and
legal thinkers of the nineteenth century on down to the present day.
There were those who held that the ownership and use of private
property is a natural right; others like Locke and later Karl Marx
connected property with the labor which produced it; then there
were some like St. Thomas Acquinas who would use it mainly for
the good of society. Economic changes of the nineteenth century
brought forth the idea that private property was essential because
it would result in more productivity, and through the Darwinian
concept of "the survival of the fittest" would produce a better race
of man. The American mind became a sort of melting pot for these
varying and often conflicting ideas on the ownership and use of
property. The practices of our legal system dealing with property
reflect this blending of ideas.
After laying a proper foundation for the answer to the question,
Professor Harding asks, "Is the legal institution of private property
in danger of destruction?" His answer is No! Then by specific re-
ferences to laws and their application he shows that private property
is in a stronger position now than formerly. This, he believes, is true
because the laws now used in regulating the use of property con-
template more consideration for those now living as well as those
yet unborn than did the earlier laws. This means that more emphasis
is put on the public or social use of property, and less emphasis is
2341 U.S. 651 (1951).
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placed on its purely private use. Professor Harding believes that by
shifting this emphasis we are protecting the system from the dangers
of Communism.
So much thought has gone into the preparation of these four es-
says and into the editing of them, that it is difficult to do them
justice by a brief review. They should be read and studied by all
students and persons who are interested in freedom and government.
S. B. McAlister*
* Professor of Government, North Texas State College.
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